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CASE SUMMARIES - SPRING 1993
registered. Plaintiff claims it is allowed statutory protection under
the doctrine of limited publication D.C.I. also argues that its fed-
eral claim is not barred by the statute of limitations because it "re-
lates back" to the original state complaint filed. Pardini cross-ap-
pealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying attorney's
fees.
Held: D.C.I.'s distribution was a general, rather than limited
publication, and was therefore divested of statutory protection.
The doctrine of limited publication applies only if two require-
ments are met: (1) the work may only be distributed to a select
group of people; and (2) the work may only be distributed for a
limited purpose. D.C.I. did not meet these requirements. Next, the
court held that D.C.I.'s federal claim was barred by the statute of
limitations as it did not arise out of the state claim and was a sepa-
rate cause of action. Finally, the court stated that as D.C.I.'s action
was not frivolous or brought in bad faith, Pardini should not re-
ceive attorney's fees. Affirmed.
J.H.
PATENT LAW
IN RE BRADLEY C. CARLSON, No. 92-1248, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
32675 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 1992).
Bradley Carlson appeals a decision of the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office which affirmed the examiner's rejection of a reexami-
nation of a claim holding Carlson's design as unpatentable. This
case is based on a design protected by a German Geschmack-
smuster, which may cause Carlson's design to be obvious. Carlson
argues that the foreign patent, the German Geschmacksmuster,
may only serve as a prior art if it discloses its invention in an ac-
cessible manner. Carlson further argues that even if the
Geschmacksmuster is prior art, his design is not obvious as his de-
sign is symmetrical and the other is asymmetrical.
Held: The court held that since the Geschmacksmuster fully
discloses the design upon which German law conferred exclusive
rights, it constitutes prior art. As to the obviousness question, the
court held that where products are designed asymmetrically, a
symmetrical design would be obvious to one of ordinary skill, and
therefore obvious and unpatentable. Affirmed.
J.H.
TRADEMARK LAW
VICTOR DECOSTA V. VIACOM INTERNATIONAL, INC., No. 91-2211,
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1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32712 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1992).
Holder of re-run rights for a certain television series appealed
jury verdict against it for trademark infringement with respect to
the depiction of a certain character in the program. Plaintiff
Victor DeCosta, since 1947, had held himself out to the public at
rodeos, hospitals, and charitable events as a black-clad cowboy
named "Paladin." He had previously brought suit against the CBS
television network alleging trademark infringement with respect to
the CBS series "Paladin." The series ran between 1957 and 1964
and featured a black-clad cowboy who appeared and behaved very
similarly to plaintiff's character, and who was also named "Pala-
din." In that case, the court held that plaintiff had failed to prove
a trademark violation. Subsequent to that decision, plaintiff regis-
tered his mark. Here, plaintiff brought a trademark infringement
action against the company which holds the re-run rights to the
original "Paladin" series.
Held: The success of plaintiff's suit depends upon the relitiga-
tion of issues that were already decided against him in his previous
action against CBS. Therefore, the doctrine of "collateral estoppel"
bars plaintiff's new claim. The fact of trademark registration is not
a relevant legal change which transforms the previously litigated
issues into new issues, thus overcoming the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. Nor does registration alone significantly affect plaintiff's
ability to successfully prove the critical element of public confu-
sion with respect to competitive uses of the same mark. Moreover,
the decisions relied on by plaintiff representing a change in the law
regarding the theory of "reverse confusion" were decided incor-
rectly and are therefore not to be considered. Reversed.
J.B.
COPYRIGHT LAW
PAUL OLSEN v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO Co., No. 91-55677, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 34033 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 1992).
Paul Olsen, plaintiff, appeals summary judgment granted in
favor of the defendant, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., in his action
for copyright infringement of his photocomposition of a logo
designed by another company. Olsen was provided with the final
logo in order to prepare a photocomposition of it. He signed a con-
tract releasing his copyright interest in the logo to R.J. Reynolds,
whose identity he did not know but was told that he could not
learn of. Olsen argues that the contract is not a transfer of his
copyright interest because the agreement transfers his interest in
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